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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRESERVING JURY
DETERMINATIONS IN AN EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002)
Micah Keating*
A Virginia jury convicted Petitioner' of capital murder and sentenced
him to death.2 Petitioner challenged the sentence, asserting that he was
mentally retarded3 and thus could not receive the death penalty. 4 On
appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed both the conviction and the
death sentence.' It concluded that the issue of mental retardation was a
factual question that should be considered and determined by the jury and
not the court.6 The Virginia Supreme Court further held that it was not
willinf to commute Petitioner's sentence merely because of his low IQ
score. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,8 and in
reversing the Virginia Supreme Court decision, HELD, that execution of
mentally retarded offenders is cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Eighth Amendment. 9

* For my parents, Michael and Patti Keating.
I. Petitioner, armed with an automatic firearm, abducted the victim, robbed him, then took
him to an isolated location where the victim was shot eight times and killed. Atkins v. Virginia, 122
S. Ct. 2242, 2244 (2002).
2. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445,453 (Va. 1999), aff'd, 534 S.E.2d 312 (Va.
2000), rev'dsub nom. Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (2002). To impose the death penalty, the
jury had to find the existence of either one or both aggravating circumstances-future
dangerousness and vileness of crime-beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 451-52. At sentencing, the
jury looked to prior felony convictions and pictures of the victim's body. Id. at 451.
3. Id. at 451. An expert testified that Petitioner's full scale IQ was 59, which fell into range
of mild mental retardation. Id. The expert conceded, however, that Petitioner was competent to
stand trial and could appreciate the nature of his crime and control himself. Id.
4. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 318 (Va. 2000), rev'd sub nom. Atkins v.
Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002). Petitioner argued that the death penalty had not been imposed on
any defendant in Virginia with an IQ score as low as his. Id.
5. Id. at 314. The Virginia Supreme Court initially ordered a re-sentencing because the first
sentencing court used a misleading verdict form. Id.
6. Id. at 320. The Court noted that the experts could not agree on Petitioner's mental status.
Id. However, the Court still concluded that it was the responsibility of the jury to assess the
credibility of the witnesses and to determine the weight to be afforded to the evidence. Id.
7. Id. at 319. In Virginia, mental retardation is one factor that may be considered in
mitigation of capital murder. Id. at 320.
8. Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2246 (2002).

9. See id. at 2252.
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The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual
punishment.'0 In defining cruel and unusual punishment, courts have
traditionally not confined its meaning to the "barbarous" methods
generally outlawed at the inception of the Bill of Rights," but have
interpreted the Amendment to recognize the currently prevailing standards
of decency that evolve and mark the progress of a maturing society.' In
Coker v. Georgia,3 the Supreme Court recognized three factors that
determine society's prevailing
standards of decency and guide an Eighth
14
Amendment analysis.
In Coker, Petitioner was sentenced to death for the rape of an adult
woman.' 5 In reviewing the constitutionality of the death sentence, the
Court sought to discern contemporary values concerning its
appropriateness by analyzing three guiding factors.' 6 Those factors
included examining legislative judgments, jury determinations, and the
Court's own judgment on the matter. 17 In applying these factors to the
circumstances in Coker, the Court noted the widespread legislative
rejection of death as an appropriate punishment for the crime of rape.18 In
fact, Georgia proved to be the only state that provided for such a
punishment.' 9 The Court then analyzed sentencing jury decisions and
determined that nine out of ten juries in Georgia had not imposed the death
penalty for rape convictions.2" Despite the objective evidence provided by
legislative judgments and jury determinations, the Court further
recognized that these factors did not wholly determine the controversy. 21
In acknowledging the third guiding factor, the Court stated that the
Constitution contemplates that in the end the Court's own judgment would
be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty

10. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be

required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." Id.
11. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 368-75 (1910).
12. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1958). The Court remarked: "The basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man." Id. at 100.
13. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
14. See id. at 592-97.
15. See id. at 587-91. While serving sentences for murder, rape, kidnapping, and aggravated
assault, Petitioner escaped from prison and entered victims' home.
16. See id. at 593-97.
17. See id.

18. See id. at 593-95. The Court noted that "[alt no time in the last 50 years have a majority
of the States authorized death as a punishment for rape." Id. at 593.
19. Id. at 595-96. Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee also authorize the death sentence for
rape convictions, but only when the victim is a child. Id. at 595.
20. Id. at 597.
21. Id.
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under the Eighth Amendment.22 In applying this subjective factor, the
Court agreed with the determination of state legislatures and sentencing
juries and concluded that death was indeed a disproportionate punishment
for the crime of rape.23
Of the three guiding factors acknowledged in Coker, the role of the
sentencing jury was most influential in guiding the Court's decision in
Ford v. Wainwright.24 In Ford, the Petitioner was convicted of capital
murder and sentenced to death.25 After spending a few years in prison,
Petitioner claimed he was insane and that his execution would violate the
Eighth Amendment.26 The Court did agree that the Constitution prohibited
execution of insane offenders. 27 However, the Court left to the state the
task of developing appropriate ways to enforce this constitutional
restriction. 2' The only limitation the Court imposed on a state was that the
factfinding procedure afford a full and fair hearing.29
Petitioner subsequently challenged the procedural adequacy of the
Florida statute that allowed the imposition of the death penalty despite
evidence of his insanity.3" Florida's procedure of imposing the death
penalty occurred mostly in the executive branch and provided the
Governor with nearly total discretion in warranting death sentences.". In
finding Florida's procedure inadequate,32 the Court reasoned that the
executive branch could not possess the neutrality that was necessary for
reliability in the factflnding process of a capital trial. 33 The Court
concluded that the required neutrality should come from the jury, after

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
25. Id. at 401.
26. See id. at410.
27. Id. The Court asserted that the prohibition of executing the insane has had a strong hold
in jurisprudence today and centuries ago in England. Id. at 409. The Court further suggested that
"[wjhether its aim be to protect the condemned from fear and pain without comfort of
understanding, or to protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless
vengeance, the restriction finds enforcement in the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 410.
28. Id. at 416-17.
29. See id.at 411. The Court afforded much deference to states when it concluded that merely
legitimate considerations would satisfy the procedural safeguards of the factfinding process. Id. at
416-17.
30. See id. at410.
31. See id. at 412. The Florida procedure for determining the competency of a condemned
inmate was as follows: the Governor appointed a panel of three psychiatrists to evaluate the inmate
in a single meeting; each psychiatrist then submitted a written report to the Governor; then, the
Governor, alone, decided whether the execution should be upheld. Id. at 403-04.
32. Id. at 416-18.
33. Id. at 416. The Court recognized that in capital proceedings generally, "factfinding
procedures aspire to a heightened standard of reliability." Id. at 411.
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considering expert oginions and mitigating factors concerning the mental
state of an offender.
The Supreme Court again had the opportunity to analyze the
factfinding process and its effectiveness in assessing appropriate
punishment, in light of an offender's mental state, in Penry v. Lynaugh.3"
In Penry, the Court re-enforced the importance of jury determinations
when it addressed the constitutionality of executing mentally retarded
offenders.36 While the Court in Penry recognized that legislation enacted
by elected officials was the clearest and most reliable objective evidence
of contemporary values," the Court's decision rested on the notion ofjury
competency.3
Petitioner, convicted ofcapital murder,39 challenged his death sentence
and asserted that it was cruel and unusual punishment to execute a
mentally retarded person with a reasoning capacity of a seven-year-old.40
Petitioner argued that there was "an emerging national consensus against
[the] execution of the mentally retarded, reflecting... 'evolving standards
of decency.""'4 The Court dismissed Petitioner's argument and noted that
the two states prohibiting such an execution did not constitute a national
consensus.42 After noting that most state legislatures provided for the
execution of mentally retarded offenders, 43 the Court ended its analysis by

shifting focus to the competency of juries.4 The Court concluded that so
long as juries could consider and give effect to evidence of mental
retardation, 45 an individualized determination of culpability and the

34. See id. at 414. The Court recognized the importance of the jury specifically in resolving
differences in expert opinion since experts often disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes
mental illness. Id.
35. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
36. See id. at 315-28.
37. Id. at331.
38. Seeid.at312-21.
39. Id. at 307. Petitioner was convicted of capital murder for brutally raping, beating and
stabbing his victim to death with a pair of scissors in her home. Id
40. Id. at 328-29. Petitioner argued that due to mental deficiencies, mentally retarded
offenders do not possess the level of moral culpability sufficient to justify imposing a death

sentence.
41. Id. at 333-34 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
42. Id. at 334.
43. See id. The Court determined that only one state prohibited the execution of mentally
retarded persons who have been found guilty of a capital offense. Id.
44. See id. at 335-38.
45. Id. at 340. The Court explained that the jury should be provided with a vehicle for
expressing its reasoned moral response to mitigating evidence when rendering its sentence. Id. at
328.
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of the death penalty could be made in each particular
appropriateness
46

case.

Unlike the Court in Penry, the instant Court did not expressly accord
such deference to juries.47 Instead, the majority focused primarily on two
of the three guiding factors expressed in Coker: legislative enactments and
its own judgment. 4 Furthermore, the instant Court did find enough
a national consensus against executing
prohibiting states to constitute
49
mentally retarded offenders.
After finding a new national consensus, the instant Court brought to
bear its own judgment and proffered two reasons to agree with the
legislative consensus.' First, the Court expressed serious doubts as to
whether the social purposes served by the death penalty-retribution and
deterrence-would be satisfied.5 Second, the Court found that mentally
a special risk of wrongful execution because of
retarded criminals faced
52
their reduced capacity.
With respect to the principle of retribution, the Court recognized that
the severity of the crime necessarily depended on the offender's
culpability5 and that its jurisprudence sought to ensure that only the most
deserving of execution are put to death.' Unlike Penry, the instant Court
held that an exemption for the mentally retarded was appropriate due to
their lesser culpability. 5" With respect to deterrence, 56 the instant Court
concluded that capital punishment could only serve as a deterrent when the
murder was the result of deliberation and premeditation. 57 The Court
46. Id. at 340.
47. Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2248-52 (2002).
48. See id. at 2248. In stating its approach to the instant case, the Court did not mention
analyzing jury decisions. Id. The Court expressed that it would first review legislative judgment
and then it would consider reasons for agreeing or disagreeing with their judgment. Id.
49. Id. at 2248-49. The Court recognized that since Penry, state legislatures across the
country began to address the issue of executing mentally retarded offenders. id. The Court further
acknowledged the consistency of the direction of change in legislature. Id. at 2249. The Court
supported its argument by noting that anticrime legislation is more popular than legislation
providing protections for guilty offenders and that the large number of states that prohibit executing
mentally retarded offenders provides evidence that society views mentally retarded offenders as
"less culpable than the average criminal." Id. The Court also noted the overwhelming vote in favor
of the prohibition in legislatures that have addressed the issue. Id.
50. Id. at 2251.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 2251-52.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. The Court defined the principle of deterrence as "the interest in preventing capital crimes
by prospective offenders." Id.
57. Id. The Court explained that the average criminal remained unprotected by the exemption
and would continue to face the threat of death. Id.
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reasoned that the same behavioral impairments that made mentally
retarded offenders less culpable-for example, their diminished ability to
control impulses-precluded them from performing the criminal calculus
necessary to further the goal of deterrence.58
In agreeing with the legislative consensus, the Court also recognized
that mentally retarded offenders face a special risk of wrongful
execution. 59 The Court attributed this special risk to the possibility of false
confessions and the lesser ability of mentally retarded defendants to give
meaningful assistance to their attorneys. 6° The Court further noted that
mentally retarded defendants were "typically poor witnesses, and their
demeanor [could] create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse.'
In conclusion, the instant Court determined that its "independent
evaluation of the issue reveal[ed] no reason to disagree with the judgment
of 'the legislatures that [had] recently addressed the matter." 62 Therefore,
the instant Court held that the execution of mentally retarded offenders
was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.63
In two separate dissents, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia
took the majority to task for their apparent disregard ofjury determinations
as part of the Eighth Amendment analysis. 64 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Justice Scalia, asserted that legislative enactments and
sentencing jury determinations should be the sole indicators of
contemporary values in Eighth Amendment analysis. 65 Chief Justice
Rehnquist further reasoned that juries, by design, were better suited than
courts to evaluate and give effect to the complex societal considerations
involved in determining an appropriate punishment." Agreeing with Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia expressed opposition to the majority's
assumption that factfinders were unable to properly account for the
deficiencies of the mentally retarded.67 Justice Scalia was expressly

58. See id.
59. Id. at 2251-52.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2252. The Court agreed with Penry when it asserted that "reliance on mental
retardation as amitigating factor [could] be a two-edged sword that may enhance the likelihood that
the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by the jury." Id.
62. Id.
63. See id.

64. See id. at 2253 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
65. Id.
66. See id. at 2253-54 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 2265 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia asserted that the majority's assumption
was unsubstantiated and contradicted the immoral belief that juries play an indispensable role. Id.
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concerned with the possibility of offenders feigning mental retardation6 8
to avoid execution--even though the offender had sufficient culpability to
receive the death penalty.69
Although Justice Scalia's concerns7° are important, they may not be
valid since the majority may not have effectively disregarded the jury
determination factor of an Eighth Amendment analysis. The instant Court
kept with precedent and examined two of the three guiding factors
acknowledged in Coker.7 ' It looked to legislative enactments and found a
national consensus, and it brought in its own judgment in proffering two
reasons to agree with the legislative consensus.72 In theory, the majority
seemed to disregard the indispensable role of the jury, but, in practice, the
deference to jury determinations may still retain its important precedential
role.
Given the new constitutional restriction upon the execution of the
mentally retarded," the instant Court followed the precedent established
in Ford and left to the states the task of developing appropriate ways to
enforce this restriction.74 Consequently, the majority rule may not be as
absolute as the dissent asserted. 75 Although the instant Court prohibited the
execution of mentally retarded offenders, it left an important factor for
state legislatures to develop: the definition of mental retardation.76
The instant Court pointed out that the real disagreement in cases
dealing with capital punishment and alleged mental retardation was in
determining which offenders were in fact mentally retarded.77 The instant
Court suggested that at least the clinical definition of mental retardation
was constitutional. 7 The clinical definition of mental retardation requires

68. Id. at 2267-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia compared the result of feigning
insanity to that of mental retardation; an insane feigner "risks commitment to a mental institution,"
while amentally retarded feigner "risks nothing at all." Id. Justice Scalia further noted that the pendency of the case prompted death row inmates claiming mental retardation for the first time. Id.
69. Id. at 2260 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592-97 (1977).
72. See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2248-51 (2002).
73. See id.at 2252.
74. Id. at 1250; see also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986).
75. See Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2260 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia acknowledged that
mental retardation was a central issue at Petitioner's sentencing. Id. Justice Scalia further noted that
the jury concluded that Petitioner's alleged mental retardation was not sufficient to exempt him
from execution in light of the brutality of his crime and his long history of violence. Id. Justice
Scalia concluded that the majority upset the jury's particularized decision on the basis of a
constitutional absolute. Id.
76. See id. at 2250.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 2250 n.22 (noting that statutory definitions of mental retardation generally
conform to the clinical definition).
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not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant
limitations in adaptive skills such as social skills, self-direction and
communication." While the instant Court set out this definition as a
guideline,"° albeit in a footnote, its focus seemed to be on the
end-mentally retarded offenders should not be executed8 1-and not the
means-how a state determines that an offender is in fact mentally
retarded.8
Justice Scalia worried that the majority decision would turn a capital
trial into a game since symptoms of mental retardation could readily be
feigned. 3 Justice Scalia was further concerned with questionable mentally
retarded offenders escaping a deserved execution despite possessing the
requisite culpability." Had the majority declared that IQ was the sole
indicator of mental retardation, Justice Scalia's concerns may not have
been exaggerated. Such a standard would have heightened the importance
of expert witness testimony and left the jury with little discretion to
impose an appropriate, individualized punishment once the expert determined that the offender's IQ coincided with mental retardation.85 However, the majority authorized the inclusion of the adaptive skills criterion
which gives the factfinder discretion to make appropriate, individualized
decisions,86 just as the Court in Penry and Fordwould require. 7
Accordingly, Justice Scalia's second concern may have been
exaggerated. 8 In applying the clinical definition of mental retardation, the
79. See id. at 2245 n.3. The American Psychiatris Association defines mental retardation as
follows:
[S]ignificantly subaverage general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is
accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of
the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living,
social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional
academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must
occur before age 18 years (Criterion C).
Id.
80. See id. at 2250.
81. See id. at 2252 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the
majority for its "post hoc rationalization [of its] subjectively preferred result." Id.
82. See id. at 2250. The Court only stated that it would leave to the state the task of
developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction.
83. Id. at 2267 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 2260 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85. Justice Scalia recognized the difficulty in defining mental illness but was confident that
the jury "play[s] an indispensable role" in such matters. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. See id. at 2250.
87. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,340(1989); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,414
(1986).
88. See Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2260 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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fact-finder could easily find that an offender, while having the requisite
low IQ (Criterion A), is not significantly limited in two or more of the

adaptive skills areas (Criterion B).89 A finding of at least two significant
limitations in certain adaptive skills areas seems hardly a strict guideline;
the fact-finder may find that while the questionable mentally retarded
offender does exhibit limitations in a few of the adaptive skills areas, those
limitations are not significant enough to satisfy the second criterion.' As
a result, according to the clinical definitions, the offender is not mentally
retarded and may constitutionally receive the death penalty. 9'
Despite Justice Scalia's concerns, the jury determination factor still
guides Eighth Amendment analysis. 92 While the instant Court did not
expressly address the importance of jury determinations, the jury remains
inherently involved in the analysis of this new constitutional restriction.93
Because the jury is so intimately involved with a particular case and is so
connected with societal views, it remains in the best position to
characterize a sympathetic offender as mentally retarded or, in the
alternative, to characterize a distrusting, culpable offender as not mentally
retarded. 94 After Atkins v. Virginia, the traditional common law approach
of determining guilt 9 endures-a jury maintains its fundamental role in
Eighth Amendment analysis.

89. See id. at 2245 n.3.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 2252. The Court only held that the execution of mentally retarded offenders was
unconstitutional. See id.
92. See id. at 2250 (acknowledging that the instant Court left the States with discretion to
enforce the constitutional restriction).
93. See id. The instant Court acknowledged that not all people who claim to be mentally
retarded are so impaired as to exempt them from execution. Id.
94. See id. at 2253 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
95. See id. at 2267-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Despite Justice Scalia's concerns about the
ramifications of the majority opinion, Matthew Hale's endorsement of the common law's
traditional method for taking account of guilt remains accurate. Id. Matthew Hale's endorsement
is as follows:
[Determination of a person's incapacity] is a matter of great difficulty, partly from
the easiness of counterfeiting this disability.., and partly from the variety of the
degrees of this infirmity, whereof some are sufficient, and some are insufficient
to excuse persons in capital offenses ....
Yet the law of England hath afforded the best method of trial, that is possible,
of this and all other matters of fact, namely, by ajury of twelve men all concurring
in the same judgment, by the testimony of witnesses ... , and by the inspection
and direction of the judge.
Id. at 2268 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting I HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 32-33 (1st Am. ed.
1847)).
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